The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) beef grading system plays an important role in marketing and promoting of beef. USDA graders inspect beef carcasses and determine quality grade within a few seconds. Although the graders are well-trained, the nature of this grading process may lead to grading errors. In this paper we examine whether systematic grader bias exists in calling quality grade. Using data from a large-scale packing plant in Midwest we find that seasonality of beef demand and macroeconomic events influence the grading behavior of USDA graders. Producers gain financially from grade called by USDA graders rather than measured by camera.
I. Introduction
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) updated the Official United States Standards for Grades of Carcass Beef in 1997 (USDA, 1997 . The USDA beef grading standards are comprised of USDA quality and yield grade designed to assess eating quality and amount of lean edible meat from a carcass, respectively. Livestock producers can predict the market value of their products by using these standardized grades. They also have an incentive to produce high-quality beef cattle since the system is designed to guarantee financial reward for higher beef quality. Consumers are able to make their informed purchasing decisions using beef grades and labels. In short, the system makes marketing process simpler and communication between producers and consumers easier (Field, 2007) .
The effectiveness of the beef grading system is guaranteed by an accurate and precise grading. In reality, however, graders employed by USDA determine grades through a visual inspection within a few seconds. Although USDA graders are well-trained and independent of both producers and packers, the nature of the grading process might lead to grading errors. These errors could diminish the farmer's incentive to produce a high-quality product (Chalfant et al., 2002) and reduce the efficiency of the marketing process.
In 2006, two camera-based grading systems were approved by the USDA in order to improve the beef carcass grading accuracy and uniformity within the industry 1 . In August 2014, the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) sought for public input on possible revisions to the U.S. Standards for Grades of Carcass Beef to help adjust for recent improvements and trends in animal raising and feeding. Although AMS has been working on improving the accuracy of beef grading, there are relatively few studies that looked at the presence and sources of grader errors. Hueth et al. (2007) used a behavior model and found the existence of grader bias in assigning yield grade. Mafi et al. (2013) found cameras/instruments are more accurate and consistent than USDA graders in assessing marbling score to determine quality grade. They also found that camera grading can reduce grader-to-grader and plant-to-plant variations.
The accuracy of the grading is crucial for the efficiency of the beef marketing system and the promotion of beef quality. The impact of grading errors on the efficiency and promotion can be minimized, if the errors are not systematically biased across time and locations (Hueth et al., 2007) . When the errors are inconsistently biased across time or locations, users of the system cannot trust the system. The unreliable system cannot play its role effectively. We, thus, focus on investigating if grading errors are systematically biased across time.
Our study builds on previous literature by suggesting the evidence of the existence of grader bias and possible sources of grader bias using data from a large-scale Midwest packing plant for the 2005 through 2008 period. The data on quality grade called by USDA graders ("called" quality grade) and measured by cameras ("measured" quality grade) of each carcass are provided along with year, month, and day of the week when cattle was processed.
The specific objectives of this study are threefold. First, we analyze the difference between "called" and "measured" quality grade and using these given quality grades we estimate the cutoff points for each quality grade and then compare these estimated cutoff points to the USDA Standard cutoff points. We expect that the propensity of grading behavior itself can be another source of grader bias. Educationalists have studied rating errors in evaluating student's performance. One of the significant errors in ratings is known as "central tendency bias". The existence of central tendency bias may be shown in beef grading if USDA graders do not follow the USDA standards and have a tendency to call grades close to the mean and avoid calling extreme grades.
Second, we examine the grader bias patterns across time to account for seasonality in beef demand and macroeconomic events. In this paper, we extend the existing literature by analyzing seasonal bias patterns. The analysis includes comparing the patterns of grading errors across seasons and years, and examining the difference in grading patterns before/after the 2008 financial crisis. Graders as human beings are possibly influenced by some form of cognitive bias.
If they have prior belief about beef demand or economic situation, their grading behavior can be biased due to the prior belief. Because USDA graders' grade influences the beef price, we expect, a priori, some effect on bias during the recession. If different grading behaviors are found during or after the financial crisis, we can conclude that macroeconomic events such as financial crises may also be another possible source of grader bias.
Finally, since USDA intends to better utilize its camera grading system in the future, it is worth the discussion and analysis of the impact of upcoming changes on producers and packers.
Another addition to the literature is our prediction of possible results of the policy change. We measure the change in financial gains/losses of livestock producers and packers from reduced use of USDA graders. For this analysis, weekly weighted averages of premiums and discounts for each quality grade are collected from USDA AMS 5-Area Weekly Direct Slaughter Reports.
These premiums and discounts data along with "measured" and "called" quality grade allow us to measure the financial impact of utilizing camera grading system instead of USDA graders. If grading errors are systematically biased, one of two groups has a financial advantage from the policy change. For instance, if USDA graders tend to call higher yield grade than the camera grading system, packers would have a financial benefit when USDA graders are replaced by a camera grading system. If, thus, we find the change of financial rewards between two groups, we can conclude that the policy influences their earnings.
To our knowledge this is the first study investigating seasonality as a possible source of grader bias. This work will contribute some of the first research measuring the impact of increased utilization of the camera grading system on livestock producers and packers. Those analyses are possible, because the data sample contains a much larger number of observations than earlier studies. This advantage enables the analysis of grader biases in a new ways and thus allows the extension to general implications of the study.
II. Model
There are eight USDA quality grades for beef carcasses: USDA Prime, Choice, Select, Standard, Commercial, Utility, Cutter, and Canner. The factors used to determine quality grade are the degree of marbling and the maturity class which are classified into 9 and 5 different levels 2 , respectively. USDA graders subjectively determine both maturity and marbling based on descriptions and illustrations provided in official USDA beef grading standards and practical work experiences.
The degree of marbling and the maturity class are combined to determine the final quality grade (Hale et al., 2015) . USDA Prime, Choice, Select, and Standard grades most commonly represent younger cattle. Results of the 2005 National Beef Quality Audit determined that more than 97% of carcasses in U.S. fed beef plants were classified as A-maturity (Garcia et al., 2008) .
Hence, in this study we assume that maturity class was A (9-30 month) or B (30-42 month).
Given the maturity class, the primary determinant of quality grade will be marbling score as reported in Table 1 . In our analysis, thus, we include the beef carcasses which are graded as Prime, Choice, Select, and Standard. Given this exclusion, the model that used marbling score as the determinant of quality grade can be built.
Let be the Marbling Score Interval for quality grade k. These intervals allow us to express quality grade in a functional form as follows:
(1) Quality Grade = {k | Marbling Score , k = Prime, Choice, Select, Standard | Maturity 42 months}.
Let be the USDA grader "called" quality grade, be a "measured" quality grade, and be a "true" quality grade for carcass i. "True" quality grade is unobserved. We do not assume that "measured" quality grade is equal to "true" quality grade because camera grading system also can make grading errors like human grading (Mafi et al, 2013) . Using these definitions, the "called" and "true" quality grade can be expressed as follows:
(2) , where are error terms for "called" and "true" quality grade, respectively. We assume that error terms follow normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation ( ). This assumption allows us to build the likelihood function to estimate cutoff points and standard errors.
The USDA Standard Marbling Score Intervals ( ) for each quality grade, as shown in If we assume that the joint probability of two events, graders call quality grade (k) and "true" quality grade is same with the "called" quality grade (k), then the likelihood function that graders want to maximize to call "true" quality grade can be defined as follows: (3) where, I( ) is an indicator function, and is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. The likelihood function is derived from the assumptions that USDA graders call quality grade to maximize the probability of calling "true" quality grade by using their own implicit intervals. Since "true" quality grade is unobserved, USDA graders call quality grade based on the result of their own visual inspection. The USDA graders use their own implicit cutoff points to determine quality grade when "true" quality grade is unobservable. The estimated cutoff points can provide us with information on how USDA graders decide quality grade.
III. Data
The data used in the analysis provide information on "called" and "measured" quality grade of the beef carcasses from May 2005 to October 2008. As contained in USDA graders tend to call more Choice than camera grading system. It is not possible to know whether USDA graders are more generous than camera from the difference. But the difference shows that one of them could be biased.
The distribution of "measured" quality grade given "called" quality grade in Figure 2 illustrates the difference in USDA graders and camera grading system. Figure 2 by USDA graders were graded as Choice (Select) by camera. This implies that USDA graders were more generous on grading the high-quality beef than camera. In case of Select, 11.9%
(42.6%) of the beef carcasses graded as Select by USDA graders were graded as Choice (Standard) by camera. This distribution represents USDA graders more severe than camera when they grade low quality beef. The difference of "called" and "measured" quality grade for the same beef carcass might imply the existence of grader bias. However, this distribution analysis is not sufficient to confirm the existence of grader bias. Thus, we will estimate the implicit cutoff 3 Since Mafi et al. (2013) suggest that camera grading system is more consistent than human grading, it is more reasonable to assume "measured" quality grade is close to true quality grade.
points for each quality grade to show the existence of grader bias and reveal possible sources of the bias.
IV. Results

Whole Sample Period Analysis
We estimated cutoff points for each quality grade using equation (3) Leckie et al. (2011) found that there is a central tendency to rater's scoring. Beef grading behavior is very similar to scoring behavior in schools.
Both USDA graders and raters, although well trained, are human being and evaluate subjects based on their subjective observations with given grading standards. These similarities lead us to consider the central tendency bias as the potential source of grader bias in beef grading.
The narrow estimated intervals for Prime and Standard means USDA graders tend to avoid calling extreme grades. And the wide intervals for Choice and Select show that graders like to call quality grade around average marbling score, 5.104 (Table 5 ). These results indicate that USDA graders tend to call central grades and avoid calling extreme grades, Prime and Standard. These grading patterns can be evidences of the central tendency bias in beef grading.
A reason of the central tendency bias in beef grading can be found from the financial impact of quality grade to producers and packers. Under the grid price mechanism, producers get a premium or discount based on the quality grade of a beef carcass. As shown in Table 6 , only
Choice grade carcasses do not receive any premium or discount. Under this mechanism, calling
Choice is the way to make less impact upon the financial reward/losses of producers and packers.
Moreover, calling central grades (Choice and Select) can be a way to avoid complaints from producers and packers. If USDA graders call extreme grades (Prime and Standard) more frequently, the probability of receiving complaints and re-grading request could be higher. Since USDA graders are independent from producers and packers, they have no intention of affecting profits of producers or packers through their grading. Thus, unless marbling score is extremely high or low, USDA graders could have a tendency to call central grades. Based on these findings, thus, we could conclude that the nature of grading behavior itself can be a possible source of grader bias.
Seasonal analysis
A large number of observations in our data set allow us to estimate the cutoff points across seasons. The estimated cutoff points for each season can help identify the effect of seasonality in beef demand on grading process. The implicit intervals of USDA graders affect the supply of each quality grade beef. For instance, when an implicit interval for Prime is narrow, it is highly possible that a supply of Prime beef is low. Graders are possibly conscious of their influence on the supply.
USDA graders may also have a priori belief about patterns of specific quality grade beef consumption over the seasons from their experience. Given the priori belief on specific quality grade beef demand, USDA graders could choose to match the supply and demand. When the demand for a specific quality grade beef is expected to be high, USDA graders could call that quality grade more. Lusk et al. (2001) suggest that demand for both Choice and Select beef in spring and summer (April through September) is more price inelastic than one in fall and winter. In addition, as shown in Figure 3 , beef per capita consumption increases in spring and summer, which are typically cookout seasons. In our sample, most of beef carcasses, as shown in Table 7 , are also processed in spring and summer (March through August). This concentration can be related with high beef demand for these seasons and also the seasonality of production. Based on these findings, we can expect that the demand for high-quality beef increases in spring and summer.
Given these expectations, we can analyze seasonal patterns in the bias by comparing the estimated intervals across seasons. If significant differences are found from the analysis, we can conclude that the seasonality in beef demand is attributable to the systematic grader bias across seasons. In grilling seasons, consumers have a willingness to pay more for high quality beef (Lusk et al., 2001) . As shown in the estimation results, USDA graders call more Prime or Choice grades in summer and less Prime and Choice in winter. It is possible that high quality beef demand during the grilling seasons is contributing to systematical grader bias across seasons.
USDA Graders could be well aware of consumers' preference change across seasons. It is, however, difficult to say that USDA graders intentionally change their grading criteria to meet the market demand. It might be more reasonable that graders may be influenced by the seasonality of beef demand because graders could not entirely get rid of influences of surrounding environments and the judgments of human beings are naturally influenced by their environments.
Annual analysis
Using the estimation results of the equation (3), we can examine the existence of grader bias across years and before/after economic events. If major economic events which contribute to beef supply and demand occur during our sample period, we can measure the effect of these events on grading behaviors through comparing the estimated intervals before/after the events.
One of the major economic events during the sample period is the global financial crisis of 2007 and 2008. The crisis led to decline in wealth and consumption of goods. Beef consumption, as shown in Figure 3 , also declined after the crisis. If this decline in beef consumption influences grading behavior, implicit intervals for each quality grade would be altered after the crisis. In order to examine the impact of the global financial crisis on grading behavior clearly, we estimated and compared implicit cutoff points before and after the crisis. As shown in Table   10 , the intervals for Choice and Select after the crisis: [5.040, 8.469) and [3.927, 5.040) , are significantly narrower than those before the crisis: [4.201, 8.279), [1.873, 4.201) . While the interval for Prime after the crisis is almost identical with the one before the crisis, the estimated interval for Standard after the crisis, (-, 1.873), is significantly wider than before, (-, 3.927).
Now it is clearer that USDA graders undervalued beef carcasses after the crisis. This change substantially results in more supply of low quality beef instead of high quality beef in a retail beef market.
The analysis clearly shows that macroeconomic event could affect beef grading behavior.
In an economic recession, USDA graders expected that consumption of high-quality beef would decline and vice versa. USDA graders also know that increase in beef price during a recession is not desirable to stabilize a retail beef market because consumers do not want to spend more money on purchasing beef when their income decreases. If graders were aware of this, they could have an intention to call less expensive quality grade.
It is also possible that USDA graders do not consider supply and demand in a retail beef market. They, however, can acknowledge that people want to purchase cheaper beef cuts when economy is bad. This simple thought can influence their grading behavior without complicated economic logic. This reason might be more plausible to account for the undervaluation of beef carcasses after the crisis. Thus, without the strong intention to control a supply of high-quality beef, grading process can be influenced by macroeconomic events.
The estimation results also show that the estimated cutoff points for each quality grade, 3.927, 5.040, and 8.469, are similar with the USDA standard, 4.000, 5.000, and 8.000, after the crisis. This shows that, USDA graders try to avoid grading errors to prevent giving financial advantage to either producers or packers due to their misbehavior.
Premium/Discount Analysis
The trend of Premiums and Discounts for each quality grade during our sample period (from Figure 4 . The premium/discount for Choice is zero over the sample period, because it is a base quality grade for Prime, Select, and Standard. In 2008, as shown in Figure 4 , premiums for Prime decreased, when discounts for Select and Standard also decreased. It means that the spread between Prime and Select (Standard) become narrow. In 2008, economy was down due to the financial crisis. Since the change of premiums and discounts relates with the consumer preference, the narrow spread in 2008 could imply that consumers chose to purchase low quality (or less expensive) beef instead of high quality beef as their income declines.
May 2005 to October 2008) is illustrated in
Our quality grade data includes a weight of each beef carcasses. It allows calculating premium/ discount of "measured" and "called" quality grade for each cattle. The difference of "measured" and "called" quality grade premium/discount indicates how much producers or packers gain/lose when USDA graders are replaced by camera grading system.
The difference of 53.9 million dollars as reported in Table 13 means that this is the amount of money which producers would lose if camera grading system were used instead of USDA graders. USDA graders give a favor to producers. This result is consistent with our analysis in the previous section. From the estimated interval for Choice, we can conclude that USDA graders were generous on grading. The generosity of USDA graders leads to producers' financial benefit. We can, thus, expect that producers would lose financially when the number of USDA graders will reduced through using more camera grading system.
Since USDA is working on reducing human graders, it might be inevitable to use more camera grading system. It is foreseeable that producers would lose financially from the change.
V. Conclusion
The analyses in this paper used data from a large-scale Midwest packing plant. The data includes We also use the weekly weighted averages of premiums and discounts for each quality grade along with two quality grades to measure the financial impact of the reduced use of USDA graders on livestock producers and packers.
The interval estimation analysis shows that USDA graders' called grades were significantly different from those measured by camera and identified possible source of grader bias using. The analysis also suggests that seasonality of beef demand and macroeconomic events such as financial crises are possible sources of grader bias. We also found that central tendency bias could be influencing the grading behavior of USDA graders from the analysis.
After we verified the existence of systematic grader bias across time, we investigated the possible impact of using camera grading methods and reduced use of USDA graders on financial grading. The analysis also represents that the producers' earnings would decline when more camera grading is utilized in the beef grading system. 081,696 -39,191,132 -53,890,564 -5,148.3 -2,167.7 -2,980.7 Figure 2. The Distribution of "Measured" Quality Grade given "Called" Quality Grade 
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